
Two years of good MANRS Improving Global Routing Security and Resilience

https://www.manrs.org/



Is there a problem?

- Internet routing infrastructure is vulnerable
 - Traffic can be hijacked, blackholed or detoured
 - Traffic can be spoofed
 - Fat-fingers and malicious attacks
- BGP is based on trust
 - No built-in validation of the legitimacy of updates




Are there solutions?

• Yes!

- Prefix and AS-PATH filtering, RPKI, IRR, ...
- BGPSEC under development at the IETF
- Whois, Routing Registries and Peering databases

• But...

- Lack of deployment
- Lack of reliable data



	ASN			
BGP Leak	Origin AS: AS number for New World Telephone Ltd. (AS 17444) Leaker AS: Suite 2101~02, 21/F, Tower 2, Nina Tower (AS 45474)	2016-11-16 15:39:21		More detail
Outage	Assoc do Inst Nac de Matematica Pura e Aplicada (AS 262829)	2016-11-16 15:32:00	2016-11-16 15:35:00	More detail
Outage	ETAPA EP (AS 27668)	2016-11-16 15:28:00	2016-11-16 15:32:00	More detail
BGP Leak	Origin AS: TECHSPACE INC. (AS 20277) Leaker AS: ViaWest (AS 13649)	2016-11-16 15:19:57		More detail
Outage	ETAPA EP (AS 27668)	2016-11-16 15:10:00	2016-11-16 15:14:00	More detail
Outage	MGNET INFORMATICA E SERVIÇOS LTDA (AS 262569)	2016-11-16 15:05:00		More detail
Outage	Global Conect Ltda (AS 262735)	2016-11-16 14:52:00		More detail
BGP Leak	<i>Origin AS</i> : iPi9 (AS 37390) <i>Leaker AS</i> : OPENTRANSIT (AS 5511)	2016-11-16 14:35:59		More detail
Outage	POWERSAT SERVICOS DE TELECOMUNICACOES LTDA (AS 262337)	2016-11-16 14:13:00	2016-11-16 14:17:00	More detail

It is a socio-economic problem — a tragedy of the commons

- From the routing perspective securing one's own network does not make it more secure. The network security is in someone else's hands
 - The more hands the better the security

- Is there a clear, visible and industry supported line between good and bad?
 - A cultural norm

A clearly articulated baseline – a minimum requirement (MCOP)

+

Visible support with commitment

Mutually Agreed Norms for Routing Security (MANRS)

MANRS defines four concrete actions that network operators should implement

Technology-neutral baseline for global adoption

MANRS builds a visible community of security-minded operators

Promotes culture of collaborative responsibility



Good MANRS

- Filtering Prevent propagation of incorrect routing information
 - Own announcements and the customer cone



- Single-homed stub customers and own infra
- **Coordination** Facilitate global operational communication and coordination between network operators
 - Up-to-date and responsive public contacts
- Global Validation Facilitate validation of routing information on a global scale
 - Publish your data, so others can validate



MANRS is not (only) a document — it is a commitment


• The members **support** the Principles and **implement** the majority of the Actions in their networks.

 A member becomes a Participant of MANRS, helping to maintain and improve the document and to promote MANRS objectives

A growing list of participants

	Country	ASNs	Filtering	Anti-spoofing	Coordination	Global Validation
KPN	NL	1136, 5615, 8737	8	8	8	8
Seeweb	IT	12637	4	1	4	1
Gigas	ES, US	57286, 27640	4	4	4	1
NTT	US	2914	4	4	4	1
BIT BV	NL	12859	4	1	4	1
Algar Telecom	BR	16735, 53006, 27664	8		8	\$
OpenCarrier eG	DE	41692		\$	8	\$
SpaceNet	DE	5539	4	8	8	8
CERNET	CN	4538	4		4	8
SpeedPartner GmbH	DE	34225	8	\$	\$	\$
Comcast	US	7015, 7016, 7725, 7922, 11025, 13367.	8	£	£	£

Two years of MANRS





You may say we're dreamers...





• How to bridge this gap?

Leveraging market forces and peer pressure

- Developing a better "business case" for MANRS
 - MANRS value proposition for your customers and your own network
- Creating a trusted community
 - A group with a similar attitude towards security

Increasing gravity by making MANRS a platform for related activities

- Developing better guidance
 - MANRS Best Current Operational Practices (BCOP) document:

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http://www.routingmanifesto.org/bcop/
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- Training/certification programme
 - Based on BCOP document and an online module
- Bringing new types of members on board
 - IXPs

MANRS training and certification

Routing security is hard

- The MANRS BCOP was envisaged as a simple instruction set
- Instead we have a 50-page document that assumes certain level of expertise
- How can we make it more accessible?

A set of online training modules

- Based on the MANRS BCOP
- Walks a student through the tutorial with a test at the end
- Working with and looking for partners that are interested in integrating it in their curricula

A hands-on lab to achieve MANRS certification

- Completing an online module as a first step in MANRS certification
- Looking for partners

MANRS IXP Partnership Programme

- There is synergy between MANRS and IXPs in this area
 - IXPs form a community with a common operational objective
 - MANRS is a reference point with a global presence useful for building a "safe neighborhood"
- How can IXPs contribute?
 - Technical measures: Route Server with validation, alerting on unwanted traffic, providing debugging and monitoring tools
 - Social measures: MANRS ambassador role, local audit as part of the on-boarding process
 - A development team is working on a set of useful actions

How to sign up

- Go to https://www.manrs.org/signup/
 - Provide requested information
 - Please provide as much detail on how Actions are implemented as possible
- We may ask questions and ask you to run a few tests
 - Routing "background check"
 - Spoofer https://www.caida.org/projects/spoofer/
- Your answer to "Why did you decide to join?" may be displayed in the testimonials
- Download the logo and use it
- Become an active MANRS participant

Please join us to make routing more secure

https://www.manrs.org/signup